Founders’ Approach on Successor Selection: game theory analysis

Article de journal


Auteurs / Editeurs


Domaines de Recherche


Détails sur la publication

Liste des auteurs: Jayantilal, S., Jorge, S. F. and Palacios, T. M. B.
Editeur: Allied Business Academies
Année de publication: 2016
Journal: Journal of Economics and Economic Education Research (1533-3590)
Lexique des acronymes: JEEER
Numéro du volume: 17
Numéro de publication: 3
Page d'accueil: 74
Dernière page: 86
Nombre de pages: 13
ISSN: 1533-3590
eISSN: 1533-3604


Résumé

Family firms are vital in economies worldwide. However, only a small minority of these
outlive their founders. The founder’s lack of a proactive approach towards the succession
process has been pointed out as a key contributor to that reality. This paper employs game
theory to study the impact of the founder’s approach on successor selection in family firms. The
results obtained for a founder who adopts an activist approach and invites his preferred
successor are compared to those where the founder just reacts to his children initiating the
succession race. The findings provide analytical evidence of the importance of the founder being
proactive to safeguard intergenerational continuity as well as increase the propensity of his/her
preferred successor being appointed.


Mots-clés

Business Strategy, Family Firms, Game theory


Documents

Pas d'articles correspondants trouvés.

Dernière mise à jour le 2019-10-08 à 00:16